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THE ACADEMY CHOKES ON FOOD BIOTECH, 
PUBLIC POLICY SUFFOCATES
By: HENRY I. MILLER, M.D.*
{1}  The National Academy of Sciences, under its 1863 congressional charter, is supposed to 
be dedicated to “investigate, examine, experiment, and report upon any subject of science or 
art whenever called upon to do so by any department of the government.”1  At least insofar as 
judging the scientific integrity of governmental regulation of biotechnology is concerned, however, 
two recent “expert” committees of the National Research Council (NRC), the research arm of the 
Academy, have been plagued by apparent bias, and their recommendations have been dubious. 
{2}  During the past two years, the Academy has placed its imprimatur on two questionable 
analyses of federal biotechnology regulatory policy toward field trials and commercialization of 
recombinant DNA-modified plants B the more recent on regulation by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), paid for by USDA,2 and another earlier report concerning oversight by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).3
{3}  The USDA has the legislative authority, primarily under the Plant Pest Act,4 to regulate the 
importation and interstate movement of plants, plant products, and other organisms that may 
introduce plant diseases or pests.  For example, there has long been a permitting system for 
“plant pests,” defined as any organism “which can directly or indirectly injure or cause disease 
or damage in or to any plants or parts thereof, or any processed, manufactured, or other 
products of plants.”5 The USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) regulations 
incorporate an inclusive list of organisms that are or that harbor plant pests.6  This approach is 
essentially binary: a plant that an investigator might wish to introduce into the field is either on 
the proscribed, inclusive list of plants pests and therefore, requires a permit – or it is exempt.  
Further, the method is risk-based, in that the organisms that are required to undergo case-by-
case governmental review are an enhanced-risk group, compared to plants not considered to be 
plant pests.
{4}  For the past fifteen years, however, the USDA also has maintained a parallel regime 
focused exclusively on transgenic plants, or those that contain heterologous DNA introduced 
with molecular techniques.7  In order to establish this mechanism, in which the scope of what is 
regulated is essentially independent of risk, the APHIS tortured the original concept of a plant 
pest as something known to be harmful and crafted a new category – a “regulated article,” 
defined as “any . . . organism or product altered or produced through genetic engineering 
which the Administrator determines is a plant pest or has reason to believe is a plant pest.”8 
The phrase “has reason to believe is a plant pest” has been broadly interpreted by the APHIS 
to include any organism that includes any amount of DNA from a plant pest,9 even a snippet of 
DNA that is incapable of conferring pathogenicity.  Two such commonly-used DNA sequences 
are the cauliflower mosaic virus S35 promoter sequence and the T-DNA from Agrobacterium 
tumefaciens.  The USDA’s case-by-case permitting process, costly field test design, and other 
requirements have made recombinant DNA-modified plants disproportionately expensive to 
develop and test. A field trial with a recombinant DNA-modified plant may be 100 times more 
expensive than the same experiment performed with a plant that has an identical phenotype but 
that was modified with less precise genetic techniques.10 
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{5}  The EPA, which regulates pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Act (FIFRA), has contrived its own version of a regulated article.  Under the statute, the EPA has 
long regulated field tests on areas greater than ten acres, the commercial use of pesticides, and 
substances that act as plant regulators, defoliants, dessicants and nitrogen stabilizers.11  In 1994, 
the EPA proposed its “plant-pesticide” rule, which brought under the jurisdiction of FIFRA all the 
substances that mediate “host plant resistance” to pests, as well as the genetic material needed 
to direct the synthesis of these substances, but only if they are introduced with recombinant 
DNA techniques.  In a final regulation published in 2001, seven years after the rule was first 
proposed, in place of “pesticide” the EPA coined the term “plant-incorporated protectants” (PIPs) 
to describe what it would regulate.12  These PIPs are defined in a way that places them within the 
FIFRA definition of a pesticide, namely, a substance intended to prevent, repel or mitigate any 
pest, but only if the plant was constructed by recombinant DNA technology.13  Plants modified 
with “conventional breeding” are expressly exempted.14  The concept of a “regulated article” or 
“plant incorporated protectant” may be inventive, but it flies in the face of the disciplines of plant 
pathology and biology, as well conflicting with the risk-based mandate of the statutes.  Moreover, 
the USDA’s and the EPA’s regulatory policies fail to acknowledge that genetic modification 
is a continuum – from crude, imprecise, traditional practices such as hybridization, intensive 
mutagenesis and somaclonal variation, to more precise and predictable recombinant DNA 
techniques.
{6}  Likewise, they fail to take into consideration the extraordinary overall safety record of 
genetic modification in agricultural research throughout both the pre- and post-recombinant-
DNA eras.  Literally millions of genetically altered, but not recombinant DNA-modified, plants are 
field tested each year without governmental oversight or strictures: the average plant breeder 
of corn, soybean, wheat, or potato, for example, may put 50,000 discrete, new genetic variants 
per year into the field, many or all of which may be the product of “wide crosses” hybridization 
in which genetic material (including that from weedy or toxigenic plants) has been transferred 
across natural breeding barriers.15  The safety record of the tens of thousands of field trials of 
recombinant DNA-modified plants that have been performed worldwide, and of the hundreds of 
millions acres of cultivated commercial recombinant DNA-modified crops – virtually all of which 
have been performed with only the plant breeding practices standard for the parental crop has 
been stunning, and the results of risk-assessment experiments have been uniformly negative.16
{7}  National and international scientific organizations including, repeatedly, the National Academy 
of Sciences and the National Research Council have addressed the question of whether there are 
unique risks associated with recombinant DNA-modified organisms with congruent conclusions.  
A 1987 white paper from the NAS concluded that there is no evidence of the existence of unique 
hazards, either in the use of recombinant DNA techniques or in the movement of genes between 
unrelated organisms.17  In 2000, an NRC report on the scientific basis of EPA’s regulation of 
recombinant plants concurred “that the properties of a genetically modified organism should be 
the focus of risk assessments, not the process by which it was produced.”18  Perhaps the most 
comprehensive and unequivocal analysis was the 1989 NRC report on the risks of recombinant 
plants and microorganisms, which concluded that “the same physical and biological laws govern 
the response of organisms modified by modern molecular and cellular methods and those 
produced by classical methods.”19  But this analysis went further, emphasizing that recombinant 
DNA techniques are more precise, circumscribed and predictable than other methods:
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Recombinant DNA methodology makes it possible to introduce pieces of DNA, consisting 
of either single or multiple genes, that can be defined in function and even in nucleotide 
sequence. With classical techniques of gene transfer, a variable number of genes can 
be transferred, the number depending on the mechanism of transfer; but predicting the 
precise number or the traits that have been transferred is difficult, and we cannot always 
predict the phenotype that will result. With organisms modified by molecular methods, we 
are in a better, if not perfect, position to predict the phenotypic expression.20  
{8}  In other words, recombinant technology is a refinement, or improvement, over older, less 
precise techniques, and its use generates less uncertainty, which led the committee to make 
the strong policy recommendation that “the nature of the process [of genetic modification] is 
not a useful criterion for determining whether the product requires less or more oversight.”21   
So much for the discriminatory treatment of the USDA’s “regulated articles” and the EPA’s 
“plant-incorporated protectants,” the case-by-case review of which is triggered by the use of 
recombinant DNA techniques.
{9}  In addition to conflicting with scientific consensus, the USDA’s and the EPA’s regulation of 
recombinant DNA-modified plants is also incompatible with the two-decade-old part of the United 
States’ federal framework that is intended specifically to guide federal agencies’ regulatory 
approach to products derived from recombinant DNA-modified organisms.  That guidance is 
contained in a 1992 statement of policy from the White House Office of Science and Technology 
Policy, “Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned Introductions 
of Biotechnology Products into the Environment,” which was specifically intended to circumscribe 
the scope of what should be subject to case by case review.22  It calls for:
[A] risk-based, scientifically sound approach to the oversight of planned 
introductions of biotechnology products into the environment that focuses on 
the characteristics of the . . .  product and the environment into which it is being 
introduced, not the process by which the product is created.  Exercise of oversight 
in the scope of discretion afforded by statute should be based on the risk posed 
by the introduction and should not turn on the fact that an organism has been 
modified by a particular process or technique.23 
{10}  On the basis of the exegesis above and the recognition in the 2002 NRC report that 
government agencies are in the “difficult position of enforcing a higher environmental 
standard for transgenic plants than the standards currently used to regulate the impacts 
of other agricultural technologies and practices,”24 one might logically have expected an 
endorsement and extension of the 1987 NAS white paper and 1989 NRC report, accompanied 
by a recommendation to rationalize the system and to regulate field trials of recombinant and 
conventional plants generally no differently, except for those plants with newly-introduced traits 
perceived to confer higher risk.  Instead, the Academy committee recommends maintaining 
the current discriminatory, process-based regulatory system that focuses on plants modified by 
recombinant DNA technology.25  It justifies this recommendation by invoking a variety of specious 
arguments.
{11}  First, the committee invokes “a general assumption that the risks associated with the 
introduction of genetic novelty are related to the number of genetic changes and the origin of the 
novel genes.”26 This author contends that there is no evidence to support these assumptions, but 
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if there were, one would expect to find intense concern about and recommendations for review of 
the widespread application of induced-mutation breeding, which has been in common use since 
the 1950’s.27  This technique involves exposing crop plants to ionizing radiation or toxic chemicals 
to induce random genetic mutations.28  These treatments most often kill the plants or seeds or 
cause detrimental genetic changes, but on rare occasions, the result is a desirable mutation, 
for example, one producing a new trait in the plant that is agronomically useful, such as altered 
height, more seeds, or larger fruit.29  In these cases, breeders lack detailed knowledge about the 
nature of the genetic mutation(s) that produced the useful trait, or about the large number of 
other mutations that inevitably have occurred in the plant.30 Yet the more than 2200 mutation-
bred plant varieties from a range of different species that have been marketed over the last half 
century have been and remain subject to no formal pre-market regulation.31
{12}  Likewise, the committee’s rationale makes it difficult to reconcile the exemption from 
regulatory review of wide crosses, hybridization in which embryo rescue or similar techniques are 
used to transfer what plant breeders call alien genes from one species or genus to another to 
create plants that would not exist in nature.32   Consider, for example, Triticum agropyrotriticum, 
a man-made “species” constructed by combining genes from bread wheat and a grass called 
quackgrass or couchgrass.33  Possessing all the chromosomes of wheat and one extra whole 
genome from the quackgrass B thereby adding tens of thousands of genes – T. agropyrotriticum 
was independently produced via wide crosses in the former Soviet Union, Canada, United States, 
France, Germany, and China, where at various times it has been grown for both forage and grain.34  
These new genetic constructions are exempt from regulation (in spite of at least the theoretical 
possibility that the new gene products could make them more weedy, toxic or allergenic than 
parental wheat varieties), although the use of recombinant DNA techniques to add a single 
quackgrass gene to wheat would precipitate an extensive and expensive pre-market review 
from either the USDA or EPA, depending on whether the introduced gene conferred pesticidal 
properties.35
{13}  As to concerns about the origin of an introduced gene, the scientific consensus holds that 
the risk of an introduced gene is related primarily to its function, not its origin.36  Moreover, the 
very concept of the “origin” of a gene has become murky with the accumulation and analysis 
of DNA sequencing data.  Nearly identical DNA sequences and biochemical pathways are found 
across vast phylogenetic distances.  Searching for homology to the E. coli genome using a high 
degree of stringency, for example, reveals gene sequences that are virtually identical in a variety 
of organisms, including other bacteria, plants, amphibia, insects and humans.37  This broad 
conservation and sharing of gene sequences in nature weakens the argument that the origin, as 
opposed to the function – of newly introduced genetic material poses a safety concern (assuming 
that the introduced material is well-characterized).
{14}  Second, the committee claims there is greater risk from recombinant DNA technology 
than other techniques because “a much broader array of phenotypic traits can potentially be 
incorporated into plants than was possible two decades ago.”38  But this is a second-order kind of 
concern: greater versatility is not the same as enhanced risk.  The FDA emphasized this point in 
its 1992 policy on foods from “new plant varieties,” which defined certain potentially hazardous 
characteristics of new foods, such as the presence of a substance new to the food supply, 
increased levels of an endogenous toxin, or the introduction of an allergen, that, if present, would 
require greater scrutiny by the agency and which could result in additional testing and labeling or 
the exclusion of the food from commerce.39  During the past decade, under this policy thousands 
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of foods in U.S. supermarkets that contain byproducts of recombinant organisms have been 
marketed, irrespective of whether the plant arose from the application of recombinant DNA or 
traditional genetic engineering methods.  Other risk-based approaches have been described for 
the oversight of field trials of recombinant plants.40  However, in spite of the weight of scientific 
consensus and empirical evidence, in a particularly infelicitous circumlocution the panel 
concludes:
[T]hat the scientific justification for regulation of transgenic plants is not dependent 
on historically set precedents for not regulating conventionally modified plants.  
While there is a need to reevaluate the potential environmental effects of 
conventionally improved crops, for practical reasons, the committee does not 
recommend immediate regulation of conventional crops.41
{15}  For practical reasons, indeed!  Not a single conventional crop could meet the requirements 
being imposed by the USDA on recombinant DNA-modified plants.  For a variety of reasons, 
conventional plant breeding would grind to a halt if it were subject to the USDA’s regimen for 
gene-spliced plants.42 First, the mechanisms for enhancing host plant resistance for conventional 
plant breeding are largely unknown because this process uses far less precise and predictable 
methods than recombinant DNA.43  Second, conventional plant breeding has led to the 
inadvertent introduction of undesirable traits into commercialized products.44   On the basis of 
such scientifically unconvincing reasoning, the NAS panel recommends continued compulsory 
case-by-case oversight by the USDA of the field trials of all recombinant DNA-modified plants.45 
{16}  Perhaps one such scientifically indefensible, internally inconsistent report could be 
dismissed as an anomaly, but the NRC’s previous report on a parallel subject, namely the 
EPA’s oversight of recombinant DNA-modified plants, was similarly flawed.46  The committee 
that produced the EPA report chose to ignore crucial aspects of its charge.47  Specifically, the 
committee failed “to examine the existing and proposed regulations to qualitatively assess 
their consequences for research, development, and commercialization of [recombinant plants 
modified to enhance pest-resistance].”48  The committee also failed to “provide recommendations 
to address the identified risk/benefits, and, if warranted, for the existing and proposed regulation 
of [recombinant plants modified to enhance pest-resistance].”49  This point is essential because  
most other analyses have found the EPA’s existing and proposed regulation to be unscientific, 
illogical and potentially damaging to agricultural research. 
{17}  Both the 1987 and 1989 NAS/NRC analyses and the analyses of other academic groups 
arrived at conclusions incompatible with the EPA approach.  The EPA approach circumscribes 
only recombinant DNA-manipulated plants for repeated, redundant case-by-case reviews of field 
trials and subjects each gene product and the requisite transgenic DNA to onerous pesticide 
registration procedures.50  A large segment of the scientific community has unequivocally 
condemned this approach.  A 1996 report by eleven scientific societies, representing 80,000 
biologists and food professionals, excoriated the EPA’s approach and warned of a number of 
negative consequences for agriculture and consumers in the event of the implementation of the 
policy of the EPA.51 This report predicted that it would:
[D]iscourage the development of new pest-resistant crops, thereby prolonging the use of 
synthetic chemical pesticides; [i]ncrease the regulatory burden for those developing pest-
resistant varieties of crops, while also increasing federal and state bureaucracy; [l]imit the 
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use of biotechnology for the development of pest-resistant plants to those developers that 
can pay the increased costs associated with additional regulation…, [h]andicap the United 
States in competition for international markets because of U.S. government policy that new 
pest-resistant varieties, or products from these varieties, be identified as containing their 
own ‘pesticides;’ and [l]imit the use of valuable genetic resources and new technologies to 
improve crop protection from pests and diseases.52
{18}  The report also offered general principles and recommendations for the oversight of new 
plant varieties, including that federal oversight should be based on scientific principles, that it 
“should focus on high-probability risk rather than hypothetical or unrecognizable risk,” and that 
“the level of risk of a plant variety to the environment or human safety is determined by the 
characteristics of the plant, not by the method by which a gene for pest defense is transferred.”53 
{19}  In 1998 the Council on Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST), an international 
consortium of thirty-six scientific and professional groups, reiterated the criticisms of the eleven 
societies’ report, characterizing the EPA’s approach as “scientifically indefensible” and stating 
that treating gene-spliced plants as pesticides would “undermine public confidence in the food 
supply.”54 
{20}  Therefore, it was extraordinary to find in the 2000 report from the Academy that “the 
committee has chosen to take EPA’s proposed rule and the overarching [federal governmental] 
coordinated framework as given.”55  This critical decision enabled the committee to produce a 
report which accepted a policy that had been censured repeatedly.  The EPA’s calls into question 
the long, distinguished history of breeding pest resistance into plants that have yielded enormous 
improvements in food production and safety, worldwide.  This is a policy that if applied to other, 
less precise technologies would have thwarted the Green Revolution, which has been, literally, life-
giving to hundreds of millions of starving people in developing countries.
{21}  The NRC’s 2000 analysis of the EPA’s regulatory approach contains language that reflects 
and endorses the scientific consensus on the nature of risk: “the committee agrees that the 
properties of a genetically modified organisms should be the focus of risk assessments, not the 
process by which it was produced.”56  This only emphasizes the logical inconsistency of choosing 
to ignore the flawed, central, fundamental tenet of the EPA’s approach to regulation; namely, 
that the use of recombinant DNA techniques is the trigger to regulation.  This tenet violates the 
regulatory principle that the degree of scrutiny should be commensurate with risk.  
{22}  How could the esteemed National Academy of Sciences twice have gone so far wrong in 
its assessment of the scientific basis for federal regulatory policy?  The game was “fixed.”  The 
USDA committee was stacked with members known to harbor antagonism or skepticism toward 
biotechnology; moreover, unlike the 1987 and 1989 NRC committees, it contained few fellows 
of the Academy.  Of the twelve members on the committee, only two were Academy fellows.  The 
EPA committee contained no Academy fellows, save the chairman.  
{23}  The committee members and invited reviewers for the EPA report were selected with 
disregard for apparent conflicts of interest and bias.  Stanley Abramson, Fred Betz and Morris 
Levin, three members of the twelve-person committee, are former EPA staff who helped to 
craft and defend a variety of process-based regulatory policies at the agency.  Another member, 
Rebecca Goldburg, has produced a succession of anti-biotechnology tracts over the past decade 
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and a half.  Moreover, during the formal review process, the document was reviewed by another 
former senior EPA official, Lynn Goldman, who had been instrumental in crafting and defending 
the policy in question, and by Jane Rissler, an intractable anti-biotechnology activist.  Three 
members of the USDA committee, Chairman Fred Gould, David Andow and Norman Ellstrand, 
are long-time skeptics about the safety of recombinant plants and have consistently advocated 
process-based regulation.  Another USDA committee member, Ignacio Chapela, is the author of a 
discredited article on supposed contamination of the teosinte gene pool by transgenes from Bt-
maize banned in Mexico.57
{24}  The report on EPA oversight had the desired result.58  After seven years of opposition from 
the scientific community to the unscientific proposed rule, the Academy report offered sufficient 
cover for the EPA to issue a final rule.59  The prestige of the Academy attached to the report on the 
USDA’s regulation, virtually assuring the permanence of stultifying, process-based regulation at 
the USDA that will unnecessarily inflate the costs of research and the commercialization of new 
plant varieties.   
{25}  The excessive regulation acts as a market-entry barrier to smaller competitors unable to 
bear inflated regulatory costs.  In contrast, the handful of large agribusiness companies currently 
involved in agricultural biotechnology will actually benefit from such extensive and expensive EPA 
and USDA regulatory regimes.  Academic researchers, the ultimate engine for innovation, are the 
most severely affected victims of excessive, ill-conceived regulation.  Operating on small budgets, 
their ability to perform field trials of recombinant plants and microorganisms is markedly 
restricted.
{26}  The late DeWitt “Hans” Stetten, an esteemed NIH researcher and administrator, once wrote 
that “[s]cience cannot tolerate the man who takes lightly his moral obligation to report strictly 
what is true.”60  It appears, however, that on certain high-profile, politically-charged subjects, the 
National Academy of Sciences lately has chosen to exempt itself from that axiom.
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